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SUPREME COURT-STA TE OF NEW YORK 
IAS PART-ORANGE COUNTY 
Present: HON. CA THERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF ORANGE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------x 




TINA STANFORD, CHAIRWOMAN, 
NEW YORK ST ATE BOARD OF PARO LE, 
Respondent. 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
----~--------------------~------~-----~-----~-----------~-----x 
To commence the statutory time 
period for appeals as of right 
(CPLR 5513 [a]), you are 
advised to serve a copy of this 
order, with notice of entry, 
upon all parties. 
Index No. 5330/2016 
Motion Date: November 9, 2016 
The follo~ing papers numbered 1 to 5 were read on this CPLR Article 78 proceeding for 
a judgment vacating Respondent's January 27, 2016 decision denying parole for Petitioner, and 
ordering a de novo parole hearing: 
Order to Show Cause - Verified Petition I Exhibits . ............................. . .. 1-2 
Answer and Return I Exhibits ................ ...... ..... . . . ...................... 3 
Reply I Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Letters of Opposition .. . ....................................................... 5 
Upon the foregoing papers the petition is disposed of as follows: 
Petitioner seeks a judgment pursuant to CPLR §7804 vacating the January 27, 2016 
decision of the Respondent New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter "Parole Board") which 
denied Petitioner release on parole, and an order directing a de novo parole hearing. Petitioner 
contends, and the Court agrees, that the Parole Board's detennination rests exclusively on (1) his 
claim of innocence of the offense for which he was convicted, which he has maintained from the 
outset and over the course of more than 38 years' incarceration, and (2) his consequent lack of 
expression of remorse for his alleged victim.1 Under the circumstances of this case, Petitioner 
contends, the Board's denial on this ground of this, his eighth (8th) application for parole release, 
evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety. 
According to the prosecuting authority, Petitioner in 1977 killed one Gregory Boyer, 
21 years of age, in revenge for a drug transaction gone bad. Petitioner was then 34 years of age. 
Ile resided with his wife and two children. He had no criminal record. It was alleged that 
Petitioner contracted to sell marijuana to Mr. Boyer, who instead took the marijuana from 
Petitioner at gunpoint and fled. Petitioner was further alleged to have visited Mr. Boyer's 
grandmother's house looking for him. ·When an unrelated individual named Julius Plaintier 
answered the door, Petitioner is alleged to have fired several shots, striking Mr. Plantier in the 
chest (but not killing him), and saying, "this is for Boyer." Approximately three weeks later, 
1The Parole Board also cited "recent letters of opposition to your release." The said 
letters were, upon this court's order, forwarded for in camera review. Due to their confidential 
nature, the court can discuss their contents only in veiled terms. These letters (a) parrot the basic 
facts of Petitioner's conviction, and (b) proffer recommendations so absurdly contradictory as to 
bespeak either a mindless vindictiveness or, more charitably, utter thoughtlessness. As such, the 
letters add nothing of value or substance to the material contained in Respondent's Answer and 
Return. 
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Petitioner was alleged to have sited Mr. Boyer on the street near Liberty Park in Queens, 
whereupon he fired several shots and killed him. 
Petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with murdering Mr. Boyer and with 
assaulting Mr. Plaintier. One and the same gun was used in both incidents, but never found. 
Petitioner acknowledges that he knew Mr. Boyer through their respective sons, but adamantly 
denied any involvement with the alleged drug transaction or with the shootings. On the murder 
case, Petitioner was offered, but declined, a plea with a sentence of 7 y; to 15 years in prison. 
He was convicted after trial and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. He was thereafter 
convicted on the assault charge and sentenced to 5 to 15 years' imprisonment. 
Upon sentencing in the murder case, defense counsel complained somewhat crypt.ically 
that the trial was "more a trial of legal issues as opposed to factual issues." The reason for this 
complaint is apparent from the decision upon appeal of Petitioner 's conviction. See, People v. 
Errol Prince, 106 AD2d 521 (2d Dept. 1984), aff'd 66 NY2d 935 (1985). It is evident from 
review of the Second Department's opinion that Petitioner was convicted by a jury of Mr. 
Boyer's murder based not on the testimony of a live witness but instead upon a transcript of 
former testimony that was read to the jury notwithstanding the People's failure to satisfy the 
prerequisites to its admissibility set forth in CPL §670.10. See id., 106 AD2d at 522. While the 
Second Department found that former testimony "highly probative on the issues of identity and 
intenf' (id.), the fact remains that the jury never had the opportunity to assess first hand the 
demeanor and credibility of a key witness against Petitioner. 
3 
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides that "[dJiscretionary release on parole shall not 
be granted merely as a reward for good coriduct or effieient perfonnance of duties while confined 
but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such irimate is released, he will 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine 
respect for the law." 
The statute directs that the Parole Board, in making its parole release decision, consider 
(as applicable here): 
"(I) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, 
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, 
therapy and interaction with staff and inmates; 
(iii) release plans including community resources, employment, education and 
training and support services ·available to the inmate; 
(iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate 
while in the custody of the department.. .. 
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, 
length of sentence, and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district 
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as 
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following 
arrest prior to confinement; and 
(viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, 
adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional 
confinement." 
The Executive Law further provides that the Board's determination to deny parole 
"shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law." 
Executive Law §259-i(5). As the Third Department observed in Matter of Hamilton v. NYS 
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014), "[t]he Court of Appeals has long 
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interpreted that language - in both current and prior statutes - to mean that 'so long as the Board 
violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review in the 
courts' (Matter of Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257 ... [1944]; see Matter of Silmon 
v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476-478 ... [2000])." Hamilton, supra, 119 AD3d at 1269. Thus, 
barring a violation of statutory requirements, "[a] parole determination may be set aside only 
when the determination to deny the petitioner release on parole evinced 'irrationality bordering 
on impropriety.'" Matter of Goldberg v. NYS Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634-635 
(2d Dept. 2013). See, Matter of Silmon v. Travis, supra, 95 NY2d at 476; Matter of Russo v. 
NYS Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980). 
Here, Petitioner's minimum 25 year sentence expired in 2002. At the time of his most 
recent parole interview on January 27, 2016, Petitioner was 72 years of age, and had been denied 
parole on seven (7) occasions. In consequence, he has been incarcerated for a period in excess of 
38 years. His COMP AS risk assessment scores are low across the board. He has only six (6) 
prison disciplinary infractions over the course of 38 years' imprisonment, and none in the last ten 
(10) years. He has positive programming accomplishments in prison. Upon his release he is 
subject to deportation to Jamaica, where his sister can provide him a place to live and to work. 
Most importantly, however, for present purposes, Petitioner has maintained his innocence from 
arrest through conviction, sentencing, 38 years' incarceration and multiple denials of parole. 
After Petitioner's eighth parole interview on January 27, 2016, the Parole Board ruled: 
Parole is denied for the following reasons. After a careful review of your record and 
this interview, it is the determination of this panel that your release at this time is 
incompatible with the welfare of society. This decision is based on all required 
statutory factors including your risk to the community, rehabilitative efforts, needs 
for a successful reintegration, institutional adjustment, case I release plans, 
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sentencing minutes and recent letters of opposition to your release. The panel 
also notes your affiliation with the Caribbean African Unity Support of Prisoners 
and the Gun Buy Back program, positive programming accomplishments, however 
discretionary release shall not be granted merely because of good conduct or program 
completion while confined. Despite your positive efforts, your release would greatly 
undermine respect for the law and would trivialize the tragic loss of life which you 
caused. Dming interview you denied involvement and expressed little remorse 
for the victims. 
The Parole Board made no finding, per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), that Petitioner 
ifreleased would not likely live and remain at liberty without viOlating the law. This is fully 
consonant with Petitioner's advanced age, favorable COMPAS risk assessment, good prison 
disciplinary record and prospects for living and working with his sister in Jamaica upon his 
release and deportation. The Board's conclusion that Petitioner's release would nevertheless be 
incompatible with the welfare of society and undermine respect for law is quite evidently and 
indeed explicitly based on Petitioner's denial of involvement in the crimes for which he was 
convicted and his consequent lack of remorse. 
In Matter of Silmon v. Travis, supra, the Court of Appeals held that the Parole Board 
may properly consider an inmate's lack ofremorse and insight into the offense of conviction in 
making parole release determinations despite the petitioner's claim of innocence: 
We conclude that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider 
remorse and insight into the offense following petitioner's Alford plea. These factors, 
we recognize, are not enumerated in the statute. However, the Board is empowered to 
deny parole where it concludes that release is incompatible with the welfare of society. 
Thus, there is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect 
by considering remorse and insight [cit.om.]. Additionally, once an individual has been 
convicted of a crime, it is generally not the Board's role to reevaluate a claim of 
innocence, either by someone who maintains innocence in the face of a guilty verdict, 
or by someone who allocutes to the facts but later claims to be innocent. 
Id. , 95 NY2d at 477. 
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However, two additional aspects of th~ Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of Silmon v. 
Travis require discussion in the context of Petitioner's case. 
First, Matter of Silmon v. Travis involved an Alford plea which, the Court explicitly 
noted, must be founded on "strong evidence of actual guilt" which is not present here. See id., 
95 NY2d at 474-475. In Silmon, the record before the Parole Board reflected strong evidence of 
the petitioner's actual guilt in the form of a letter from his own trial counsel "stating that 
petitioner had maintained his innocence but faced the admission of evidence at trial that could 
have been dispositive of guilt and that, due to the nature of this evidence, there was a strong 
likelihood that a jury would convict him-." Id., at 473, 476. Here, in contrast, Petitioner has 
consistently maintained his innocence at the expense of (a) a favorable plea deal, and (b) the 
opportunity for parole release. Moreover, the record before the Parole Board here does nm 
contain strong evidence of Petitioner's actual guilt; and while a jury found him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it did so, as noted above, based on a transcript of testimony and without any 
·opportunity to assess the demeanor and credibility of a key witness against Petitioner. In the 
circumstances of this case, then, a lack of remorse and insight cannot with confidence be inferred 
from Petitioner's simply maintaining his innocence. 
Second, the Court in Matter ofSilmon v. Travis upheld the_Par.ole Board's determination 
because it properly considered the petitioner's lack of remorse and insight into his crime in 
determinjng whether there was a reasonable probability that he could live at liberty without 
violating the law, i.e., in making a determination wlrich the Parole Board glar.ing.ly omilted to 
make in this case. The Silmon Court wrote: 
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At petitioner's parole hearing, the Board was required to assess whether he presented a 
danger to the communi ty, or whether there was a reasonable probabilitv that he could Live 
at liberty without repeating his offense .... Since discretionary release may not be granted 
merely as a reward for exemplary conduct, the Board evaluated petitioner's rehabili-
tative progress to dete1mine if be still posed a danger, and in that connection properly 
considered remorse and insight into the criminal act. 
We conclude that petitioner's personal refusal to admit the specific facts of the crime at 
the time of the Alford plea did not constrain the Parole Board's ensuing responsibility to 
confirm, within a reasonable probability, !hat petitioner is ready lo rejoin the community. 
That is so for a convicted defendant who maintains his innocence at and after trial, for a 
defendant who allocutes to the facts but later declares his innocence, and it is also the 
case here .... 
Id., 95 NY2d at 4 77-4 78 (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, the Parole Board did not consider 
Petitioner's remorse and insight into the crime in "evaluat[ing] petitioner's rehabilitative 
progress to determine ifhe still posed a danger." As noted above, the Board did not (and frankly 
could not) find at this juncture that Petitioner still poses a danger to the community. Instead, 
the Board improperly cited Petitioner's denial of involvement in the crimes of conviction and 
consequent failure to express remorse as the sole justification for the very different conclusion 
that his release "would greatly undermine respect for the law and would trivialize the tragic loss 
of life which you caused." Whether or not that conclusion is correct, it is not justified by Silmon 
and does not logically follow from the cited premises. 
By reason of the foregoing, the Parole Board's January 27, 2016 determination denying 
Petitioner release on parole evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety. This court is left with 
the profoundly unsettling conviction that an elderly man who is otherwise a good candidate for 
parole after 38 years' incarceration has been, is being, and will perpetually be denied parole 
release only because he continues to assert a not-facially-implausible claim of innocence that he 
has consistently maintained at personal cost right from the beginning. 
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It is therefore 
ORDERED, ADmDGED AND DECREED, that the Petition is granted, and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the New York State Board of Parole 
is directed to grant Petitioner a de novo parole release interview and determination, before a 
different pane.I, within forty-five (45) days of the date hereof. 
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of th~ court. 
Dated: November ID, 2016 ENTER 
Goshen, New York 
HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETI, A.J.S.C. 
HON. C. M. BARTlEiT 
JUDGE NY STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 
ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
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